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Abstract
Peer-to-peer lending platforms are increasingly important alternatives to
traditional forms of credit intermediation. These platforms attract projects
that appeal to socially motivated investors. There are high hopes that these
novel forms of credit intermediation improve financial inclusion and provide
better terms for borrowers. To study these hopes, we introduce altruistic in-
vestors into a peer-to-peer model of credit intermediation where the terms of
the loans are determined through bilateral bargaining. We find that altruistic
investors do not improve financial inclusion in the sense that all projects that
are financed by altruistic investors are also financed by rational investors. Al-
truistic investors offer, however, better borrowing conditions in the sense that
the borrowing rates with altruistic investors are always lower in comparison to
the ones obtained with rational investors. Furthermore, investors with strong
altruistic preferences are willing to finance projects which generate an expected
financial loss. We also introduce joint liability contracts and we find that they
increase borrowing rates and have no effects on the surpluses of borrowers and
investors. Finally, for a certain range of parameters the model’s allocation is
observationally equivalent to a model with rational investors that have low
bargaining power. Outside of this range, the model generates equilibrium allo-
cations that are not incentive feasible in a model with rational investors which
is interesting from the point of view of pure bargaining theory.
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1 Introduction
In classical asset pricing models investors base their investment decisions on risk and
expected returns. Recent empirical evidence suggest that investors also incorporate
many non-financial considerations into their investment decisions such as religious,
social and political values as well as social norms (Hong and Kacperczyk, 2009; Hong
and Kostovetsky, 2011; Pfeifer, 2010). The Forum for Sustainable and Responsible
Investment (US SIF) emphasizes that personal values have a large impact on indi-
vidual investment decisions. Increasingly, socially responsible investors constitute an
important part of financial markets. In 2018, roughly 12 (USD) trillion were invested
with socially responsible investing mandates (US SIF, 2018).1
Peer-to-peer lending platforms and crowdfunding platforms have established them-
selves as an alternative to traditional forms of credit intermediation. These platforms
attract projects that appeal to socially motivated investors, who do not only focus on
the expected return and risk of a project but who also base their investment decision
on other considerations.2 There are high hopes, therefore, that these novel forms
of credit intermediation improve financial inclusion and provide ”fairer” terms for
borrowers.
To study these hopes, we introduce altruistic investors and microentrepreneurs
into a peer-to-peer model of credit intermediation. The terms of the loans are deter-
mined through bilateral bargaining. The key take aways are that altruistic investors
do not improve financial inclusion in the sense that all projects that are financed
by altruistic investors are also financed by rational investors. Altruistic investors
offer, however, ”fairer” borrowing conditions in the sense that the borrowing rates
with altruistic investors are always lower in comparison to the ones obtained with
rational investors. We also find that investor with strong altruistic preferences are
willing to finance projects which generate an expected financial loss. Finally, for a
certain range of the parameter that represents altruism, the model’s allocation is
observationally equivalent to a model with rational investors with low bargaining
power. In this range, the model can replicate any allocation that can be achieved in
1Experimental evidence also suggest that investors’ preferences for social norms affect their in-
vestment decisions. For instance, Riedl and Smeets (2017) find that social preferences are positively
correlated to holdings in socially responsible investment mutual funds. Along the same lines, Brod-
back et al. (2019) investigate the effects of altruistic preferences on investment decisions and explain
the coexistence of monetary and social returns. They show that altruistic persons are willing to
accept financial losses for social returns.
2New technologies such as peer-to-peer lending platforms and crowdfunding platforms offer new
forms of financial intermediation such as donation-based, equity-based and reward-based funding
(e.g., Kiva.org).
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a bargaining model with rational investors. Outside of this range, the model gener-
ates equilibrium allocations that are not incentive feasible in a model with rational
agents which is interesting from the point of view of pure bargaining theory.
2 Model
The economy is populated with a large number of identical microentrepreneurs or
borrowers and a large number of identical investors. There are two periods t = 0, 1.
Each borrower is endowed with a risky project in t = 0. The gross returns of the
projects are random and stochastically independent: with probability p the gross
return of a project is y > 0. With probability 1− p the project fails and y = 0.
Borrowers are risk-neutral. In order to carry out their projects, each borrower
needs to borrow one unit of an indivisible capital good. The real interest paid on the
loan is r. We abstract from private information issues and assume that borrowers
repay their loans if their projects succeed. In what follows we consider a match
between a representative investor and a representative borrower.
The borrower’s expected surplus is
Sb = p [y − (1 + r)]− u, (1)
where u is an effort cost for implementing the project.3 The term p [y − (1 + r)] is
the expected net return of the project since py is the expected return and p(1 + r)
is the expected payment to the investor. The borrower’s participation constraint is
Sb ≥ 0. (2)
Each investor is endowed with one unit of and indivisible capital good in period
t = 0. This unit can be either invested in a borrower’s risky project or in a risk free
project, where ρ is the economy wide risk-free real gross interest rate. The investors
are risk neutral with altruistic preferences. The representative investor’s expected
surplus is
Si = p(1 + r) + aSb − ρ. (3)
The investor’s expected surplus depends on the expected return of his investment
p(1+r)−ρ plus the altruistic term aSb. The altruistic parameter 1 > a ≥ 0 measures
how strongly the investor cares about the borrower’s surplus. Throughout the paper
we call an investor with a > 0 an altruistic investor and we call an investor with
3An another interpretation of the term u is that it represents the borrower’s reservation utility.
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a = 0 a rational investor. This simple form of representing altruistic preferences is
based on Levine (1998). In Section 3, we discuss it in more detail.
The investor’s participation constraint is
Si ≥ 0. (4)
Note that the investor’s utility from the outside option is independent of the param-
eter a. This reflects the fact that the investor only has altruistic preferences towards
certain projects or certain borrowers.
In a standard model of financial intermediation (for a = 0), it is easy to show
that it is socially optimal to carry out all projects with an expected return py that
covers the utility cost of the borrower u plus the outside option of the investor ρ.
That is,
s ≡ py − ρ− u ≥ 0. (5)
One of the issues we discuss throughout the paper is whether inequality (5)
continues to hold with altruistic investors. In particular, would an altruistic investor
be willing to finance a project with s < 0? This question relates to financial inclusion.
If altruistic investors also finance projects with s < 0, then more microentrepreneurs
have access to credit which promotes financial inclusion. We will come back to this
question throughout the paper.
We can rewrite the investor’s participation constraint (4) as follows
p(1 + r) ≥ ρ− as
1− a. (6)
If inequality (6) is satisfied, the investor is willing to provide the capital good. In
a standard model of financial intermediation (for a = 0), the inequality reduces to
p(1 + r) ≥ ρ. In this case, the investor is willing to provide capital if the expected
return p(1 + r) covers at least the risk free rate ρ. The altruistic parameter a lowers
the right-hand side of (6). This implies that an altruistic investor is willing to accept
a lower interest rate for the project than an investor with no altruistic preferences.
In what follows, we define the expected profit of the investor as
pi ≡ p(1 + r)− ρ (7)
In a standard model of financial intermediation an investor requires a positive ex-
pected profit in order to be willing to invest.
From (6), there exists a critical interest rate 1 + r∗ such that the investor is
indifferent between providing and not providing the capital good:
p(1 + r∗) = ρ− as
1− a. (8)
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The interest rate r∗ is the interest rate that one would obtain in a model with
many investors and few borrowers under Bertrand price competition. In such a
market, the investor obtains no surplus. Note that the interest rate is decreasing in
a and satisfies pi < 0 for all a > 0. Thus, with altruistic preference and Bertrand
price competition, investors are willing to accept a financial loss.
In what follows, we consider bilateral bargaining between an investor and a bor-
rower (see Binmore et al., 1986). The parameter 1 ≥ θ ≥ 0 is the bargaining power
of the investor. The Nash bargaining solution satisfies
rn = argmaxr(Si)
θ(Sb)
1−θ,
and the first-order condition is
Sb
Si
=
(1− θ)
θ(1− a) . (9)
Use (1) and (3), to rewritten (9) as follows:4
py − p(1 + rn)− u
p(1 + rn)(1− a) + a(py − u)− ρ =
(1− θ)
θ(1− a) . (10)
Solving equation (10) for p(1 + rn) yields
p(1 + rn) = ρ+ θ˜s, (11)
where θ˜ ≡ (θ − a)/(1 − a). Note that if the borrower has all the bargaining power
(θ = 0), then the interest rate equals the one that is obtained under Bertrand price
competition (see (8)). Furthermore, if the investor has rational preferences (a = 0),
then p(1 + rn) = ρ + θs. In this case, the investor makes an expected profit since
p(1 + rn)− ρ = θs ≥ 0. Finally, pi = 0 if θ = a.
Proposition 1 (Interest rate and Profits) Properties of the bargaining solution:
(i) rn is decreasing in a. (ii) For θ˜ < 0 (a > θ), the investor is willing to accept a
financial loss. (iii) For θ˜ > 0 ( θ > a), the investor makes a financial profit and the
model is observational equivalent to a model without altruistic investors (a = 0) and
bargaining power θ˜.
4The second derivative with respect to r is negative if s > 0. Accordingly, the first-order
condition (9) describes a maximum.
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Proposition 1 summarizes the key properties of the model. According to (i), al-
truistic investor preferences lower the borrowing costs since θ˜ is decreasing in a. This
is consistent with experimental evidence reported in Brodback et al. (2019). Accord-
ing to (ii), for a sufficiently large a, the investor is willing to provide financing even
though he makes an expected loss. This finding is consistent with the experimental
findings in Riedl and Smeets (2017). Finally, according to (iii), if a is sufficiently
small (θ > a), the investor makes an expected profit. In this case, we get the same
interest rate as in a model without altruistic preferences (a = 0) and bargaining
power θ˜ > 0. For θ < a, the interpretation of this equivalence is less straightfor-
ward because in this case the investor makes an expected financial loss which is not
incentive feasible in a model without altruistic preferences.
In the following we discuss how altruistic investors affect financial inclusion. Re-
call from (5) that in standard model with rational investors all projects are financed
that satisfy s ≥ 0. Improving financial inclusion would require that investors are
willing to finance additional projects; i.e., projects with s < 0. This is a priory
not impossible because according to Proposition 1 altruistic investors are willing to
finance projects that make an expected loss.
Proposition 2 (Financial Inclusion) Altruistic investors do not improve finan-
cial inclusion.
One can easily show that the participation constraint of the investor is always
satisfied since it only requires that θ ≥ 0. The borrower’s participation constraint is
satisfied if
s ≥ 0. (12)
To see this use equation (11) to rewrite the borrower’s participation constraint (2)
to get (12). Thus, neither the altruistic preference parameter a nor the bargaining
parameter θ can lead to a situation where projects with s < 0 are carried out.
Proposition 2 has a straightforward interpretation with respect to financial inclu-
sion. In a classic model with rational investors (a = 0), all projects with s ≥ 0 are
implemented. The same is true with altruistic preferences. This clearly shows that
altruistic preferences do not affect the type of projects that are financed. They have,
however, important distributional consequences which we discuss in the following
sections.
Some additional properties of the bargaining solution are presented in Proposition
3.
Proposition 3 (Additional Properties) Additional properties of the bargaining
solution:
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(i) ∂(1 + rn)/∂y = θ˜ < 0 if a > θ;
(ii) ∂(1 + rn)/∂u = −θ˜/p < 0 if θ > a;
(iii) ∂(1 + rn)/∂ρ = 1 + θ˜ > 0 and ∂(1 + rn)/∂θ = s/(1− a) > 0.
According to (i), the effect of an increase of the output y on rn depends on the sign
of θ˜. If a is sufficiently large (a > θ), then θ˜ < 0 and the interest rate is decreasing
in y. In contrast, if θ > a, then θ˜ > 0 and an increase in y increases the interest rate.
According to (ii), the effect of an increase of the borrower’s outside option u on rn
depends on the sign of θ˜ as well. If θ > a, then θ˜ > 0 and an increase in u decreases
the interest rate (since s is decreasing in u). For a = 0, this is clearly the case.
In contrast, if θ < a, then θ˜ < 0, and an increase in u increases the interest rate.
We will discuss this result in more detail when we study the investor and borrower
surpluses. According to (iii), an increase in the investor’s outside option ρ increases
the interest rate rn. Note also that an increase in the investor’s bargaining power θ
increase the interest rate rn as well.
2.1 Total surplus effects
We now study how the total surplus and the individual surpluses react to various
parameter changes. The total surplus is TS = Si + Sb. Use equation (9) we can
write it as follows:
TS =
1− θa
(1− θ)Sb =
1− θa
θ(1− a)Si. (13)
By using equations (1) and (11) we can write (13) as follows:
TS =
1− θa
1− a s. (14)
The following results emerge emerge from (14): First, for a = 0, TS = s. Second, the
same result is also attained for θ = 1. That is, if the investor has all the bargaining
power, the altruistic preference parameter a has no effect on the total surplus of the
match. Third, increasing a has a positive effect on TS. Fourth, increasing θ has a
negative effect on TS. Finally, increasing s has a positive effect on TS.
2.2 Distributional effects
In order to derive the distributional effects of changes in parameters, we have to
derive Si and Sb. Use equation (14) to rewrite (13) as follows:
Sb =
1− θ
1− as and Si = θs. (15)
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There are several interesting results that emerge from (15). First, the altruistic
preference parameter a has no effect on the investor’s surplus. It only affects the
borrower’s surplus positively. A constant Si is only possible if an increase in a
decreases the interest rate by the amount that holds the investor’s surplus constant.
That is, an investor obtains more direct utility from a higher a and lower utility from
a lower interest r. Second, an increase in s benefits both agents. If (1− θ)/(1− a) >
θ, the borrower benefits more than the investor. This is the case if the altruistic
parameter is sufficiently large, that is if a > 2 − 1/θ, or if the bargaining power of
the investor is sufficiently low, that is θ < 1/(2 − a). Third, increasing θ increases
the investor’s surplus and decreases the borrower’s surplus.
3 Discussion and Extension
In this section we show how we can derive our preferences from the more general
approach of Levine (1998). We also introduce joint liability contracts and show how
they affect out results.
3.1 Altruistic preferences
A generally valid utility function representing social preferences does not exist.5
For this paper, we have chosen a simple and well-known utility function to represent
altruistic preferences. It has been proposed by Levine (1998) and formalizes altruistic
preferences as follows:
Ui = ui +
∑
j 6=i
ai + ajλ
1 + λ
uj. (16)
In a multiperson setting, the coefficient −1 ≤ ai ≤ 1 for i ∈ {1, ..., I} measures
person i′s altruistic preferences towards person j, j 6= i. The multiplicative term
aiuj simply means that agent i’s utility depends on the utility of person j. The
factor 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 is a weighting of the parameter ai against aj. If λ > 0 is positive,
an altruistic agents with ai > 0 sympathizes more strongly with agent j who has also
altruistic preferences (aj > 0) than with an agent j who has no altruistic preferences
aj = 0. For ai, aj = 0 equation (16) reduces to rational preferences.
5For instance, Fehr and Fischbacher (2002, C2-C4) characterize the term social preferences and
they differentiate between the following emotional characteristics: (1) reciprocity, (2) aversion to
inequality, (3) envy and malicious joy, and (4) altruism and (5) shame and guilt. In our paper we
focus on altruistic preferences.
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In our model, only the investor has altruistic preferences and so aj = 0 and λ = 0.
Thus, for an investor i matched with a borrower j equation (16) simplifies to
Ui = ui + aiuj. (17)
3.2 Extension: Joint liability
In this section we consider a joint liability contract. One investor is matched with
two borrowers. If one borrower cannot repay the loan, then the other borrower if
successful will have to pay c, with 0 ≤ c ≤ 1 + r, to partially compensate the
investor for the failure of one of the projects.6 For this extension, we assume that c is
exogenous. We can easily extend the analysis by assuming that c is also determined in
bargaining problem that follows. We continue to assume that borrowers honor their
promises if their projects are successful. In this setting a representative borrower’s
surplus with a joint liability loan contract is
Sb = p
2 [y − (1 + r)] + p (1− p) [y − (1 + r)− c]− u. (18)
With probability p2 both borrowers are successful and borrower j pays 1 + r. With
probability p(1−p) only borrower j is successful. In this case, she makes the payment
1 + r + c. With probability (1 − p) her project fails and she makes no payment.
Simplifying equation (18) yields
Sb = p [y − (1 + r)]− u− p(1− p)c. (19)
The borrower’s participation constraint is Sb ≥ 0. Evidently, joint liability as ex-
pressed by the parameter c tightens the borrower’s participation constraint for a
given r.
The investor’s surplus satisfies
Si = 2
{
p2(1 + r) + p(1− p)(1 + r + c) + aSb − ρ
}
. (20)
With probability p2 both projects are successful and both borrowers repay their
debts. With probability p(1 − p) only one project is successful and the investor
receives the payment 1 + r + c. With probability (1 − p)2 both projects fail and
no payment is made. The third term in equation (20) is the altruistic part of the
investor’s preferences as explained in the introduction. The multiplicative term 2
6For example, Armendariz (2010) and Markheim (2018) provide an overview into the modeling
of debt contracts with joint liability in the context of microfinance.
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reflects the fact that the investor has invested into two projects. Equation (20) can
be simplified as follows:
Si = 2 [p(1 + r) + p(1− p)c+ aSb − ρ] . (21)
The investor’s participation constraint Si ≥ 0. Solving for p(1 + r) yields
p(1 + r) ≥ ρ− as
1− a − p (1− p) c. (22)
Evidently, the joint liability parameter c relaxes the investor’s participation con-
straint for a given r. There exists a critical interest rate 1 + r∗J , such that the
investor is indifferent between providing and not providing the loan
p(1 + r∗J) = ρ−
as
1− a − p (1− p) c. (23)
Note that we obtain the same expression as in (8) except for the term p (1− p) c.
In order to derive the Nash bargaining solution, we assume that the two borrowers
act as a single entity. The joint surplus of the two borrowers is 2Sb where Sb satisfies
Sb ≡ p [y − (1 + r)]− p (1− p) c− u. (24)
The Nash bargaining solutions is
rJ = argmaxr(Si)
θ(2Sb)
1−θ,
where 1 + rj satisfies
p(1 + rJ) = ρ+ θ˜s− p(1− p)c. (25)
Comparing (25) with (11), we immediately see that the only difference is the
term p(1 − p)c: The only effect that the joint liability parameter c has is to reduce
the interest rate. Accordingly, all results presented in Propositions 1 and 3 continue
to hold. Furthermore, one can also one show that the borrower’s participation con-
straint py − p(1 + r) − p(1 − p)c ≥ u continues to hold for s ≥ 0. Thus, the joint
liability parameter c does neither affect the type of projects that are implemented,
that is it does not affect financial inclusion. Finally, we find that the joint liability
parameter c does not affect the individual surpluses nor the total surplus. However,
as discussed before, it decrease the interest rate. It does this in a way that keeps the
individual surpluses constant.
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4 Summary
We introduce altruistic investors and microentrepreneurs who need funding into a
peer-to-peer model of credit intermediation. The terms of the loans are determined
through bilateral bargaining. The model sheds light on how new technologies such as
peer-to-peer lending platforms with altruistic investors affects borrowing conditions,
financial inclusion and the surpluses of investors and borrowers.
The altruistic preference of the investor is captured by the altruistic parameter
a where a higher a means that the investor cares more about the wellbeing of the
borrower. We find the following: First, altruistic preferences have no effect on the
type of projects that are financed. Accordingly, altruistic investors do not promote
financial inclusion. Second, an increase in a reduces the interest rate. Thus, altru-
istic preferences benefit borrowers by reducing the interest rates that are negotiated
between investors and microentrepreneurs. Third, an investor with strong altruistic
preferences is willing to accept an expected financial loss. Fourth, we find some in-
teresting distributional effects. For example, the investor’s surplus is independent of
a. In contrast, the borrower’s surplus is increasing in a.
The model also generates results that are of interest from the point of view of
bargaining theory. For a certain range of the parameter a, the model’s allocation
is observationally equivalent to a model with rational preferences and low investor
bargaining power. In this range, the model can replicate any allocation that a bar-
gaining model with rational investors is able to attain. For some different range of a,
however, the model generates allocations that are not incentive feasible in the same
bargaining model with rational investors. Finally, we also introduce joint liability
contracts but we find that they have no effects on the well-being of borrowers and
investors as measured by their surpluses.
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